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WORKPLACE HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT 
ROBERT J. TEPPER* AND CRAIG G. WHITE** 
ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade, claims of workplace harassment have received 
greater attention.1  Sometimes called “workplace bullying,” such harassment is 
commonly defined as behavior by a perpetrator that may involve repeated 
verbal abuse, offensive conduct that may threaten, humiliate, or intimidate a 
target, or efforts to sabotage a target’s performance.2  As commonly defined, 
the subject behavior is intentional, results in physical or psychological harm to 
the target, and makes the target’s job performance more difficult.3  At times, 
perpetrators, who may include administrators and faculty members, combine 
their efforts to abuse and harass the target, a phenomenon known as 
“mobbing.”4  Both federal and state statutory law currently provide remedies 
 
* C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D.; Lecturer in the Accounting Department, University of New Mexico, 
Anderson School of Management.  Presented by the authors at the 2010 Annual Conference of 
the American Accounting Association - Southwest Region, Dallas, Texas, March 6, 2010. 
** C.P.A., Ph.D.; Chair of the Accounting Department; Moss Adams Professor of Accounting, 
University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Management. 
 1. See David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year 
Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251, 251–53 (2010). 
 2. Definition of Workplace Bullying, WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., http://www.workplace 
bullying.org/individuals/problem/definition (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 3. Michael E. Chaplin, Workplace Bullying: The Problem and the Cure, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 437, 445 (2010); Katherine Lippel, The Law of Workplace Bullying: An International 
Overview, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 2–3 (2010) (contrasting the scholarly definition of 
workplace bullying, which addresses frequency and duration of negative behavior and excludes 
isolated events or equal strength interactions, with the lay definition of bullying as negative 
behavior that harms the target). 
 4. Audrey Williams June, ‘Mobbing’ Can Damage More Than Careers, Professors Are 
Told at Conference, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 11, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/ 
Mobbing-Can-Damage-More-Than/47736/.  The distinction between bullying and mobbing has 
been explained: 
Workplace mobbing is like bullying, in that the object is to rob the target of dignity and 
self-respect.  Here, however, it is not a single swaggering bully that the target is up 
against, but the juggernaut of collective will.  The message to the target is that everybody 
wants you out of here.  Bullies often play leading roles in mobbing cases, whether as 
targets or perpetrators. 
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for such behavior where it is motivated by discriminatory animus and the 
target is a member of a protected class (such as gender or national origin).5  
But no U.S. jurisdiction currently recognizes a cause of action against this sort 
of behavior when it is not linked to discrimination—in contrast to several 
European countries that provide remedies for workplace bullying untethered to 
discriminatory animus.  Even though legislation to provide a remedy for such 
behavior has been introduced in several states, it has not been enacted, and it is 
often accompanied by strong opposition from employer interests.6  Courts have 
likewise been reluctant to expand the law to accommodate such claims.7 
 
Kenneth Westhues, Summary for the Workplace Mobbing Conference (Waterloo Anti-Mobbing 
Instruments, Novotel, Brisbane), Oct. 14–15, 2004, at 1, available at http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/ 
~kwesthue/wami.pdf.  Thus, mobbing is group harassment, “a process of abusive behaviors 
inflicted over time.”  Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 2009).  Despite the original 
distinction between workplace bullying and mobbing, the two terms often are used 
interchangeably.  Jordan F. Kaplan, Help Is on the Way: A Recent Case Sheds Light on 
Workplace Bullying, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 141, 144 (2010). 
 5. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Alex Long, 
State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans With Disabilities Act, 65 
U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 601 (2004). 
 6. For example, the Society for Human Resource Management reportedly opposed such 
legislation in New York on the grounds that it is generally “bad for business” and specifically that 
(1) human resource professionals are dedicated advocates for employees; (2) employers have 
adequate incentives to combat workplace harassment because it affects the health and morale of 
the workforce (as well as the image and profitability of the employers); (3) employers have 
studied the issue and many have codes of conduct and dispute resolution mechanisms to address 
it; and (4) such legislation would undermine existing efforts to combat the problem, strain 
employer-employee relationships, and increase the cost of doing business―given that employers 
will be called upon to defend frivolous lawsuits from unscrupulous employees or incur liability 
for lost wages, medical expenses, emotional distress, punitive damages and attorney’s fees.  See 
G. Namie, SHRM Opposes Anti-Bullying Healthy Workplace Bill, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL 
(June 18, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://healthyworkplacebill.org/blog/?p=144. 
 7. See Thomas v. N. Telecom, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635 (M.D. N.C. 2000) (noting 
that workplace conduct rarely supports a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(“IIED”)); see also Crocker v. Griffin, No. COA09-1000, 2010 WL 1961258, at *4–5 (N.C. Ct. 
App. May 18, 2010) (action brought by four former employees listing twenty-eight acts of 
supervisor involving “yelling, shouting, or saying insulting or demeaning things” did not state an 
IIED claim).  One court has affirmed a verdict in favor of a plaintiff on an assault theory while 
allowing an expert witness to testify as to the presence of workplace bullying.  Raess v. Doescher, 
883 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ind. 2008).  No one rationale completely supports the result in the case.  
The panel majority determined that the plaintiff failed to properly object to the expert’s testimony 
on workplace bullying and therefore any error was forfeited.  Id. at 797.  It further determined 
that that the phrase “workplace bullying” was a general descriptive term that could be a form of 
IIED.  Id. at 799.  Another member of the panel majority found the plaintiff’s objection sufficient, 
but any error in admissibility harmless because the expert’s testimony went to the merits of an 
IIED claim which the jury rejected.  Id. (Sullivan, J., concurring in result).  A dissenting member 
of the panel determined that the objection had been preserved, and that the testimony concerning 
workplace bullying was erroneous and not harmless.  Id. at 801–02 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
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This Article discusses the development of harassment claims that might be 
pursued in a judicial forum, with an emphasis in the academic context.  It 
suggests that special characteristics, including a decentralized environment, a 
focus on academic pursuits, and a hierarchical intellectual environment, may 
allow such behaviors to go unchecked at an academic institution.8  At the same 
time, it cautions that categorizing behavior as workplace bullying is necessarily 
a nuanced determination and that, therefore, any statutory or administrative 
measures must take care to protect academic freedom.  The free exchange of 
ideas in teaching and research (and faculty and departmental governance) bears 
the potential at all times to offend powerful and not-so-powerful internal and 
external interests alike.  Accordingly, any measure designed to deal with 
workplace bullying must recognize this concern and preserve intellectual and 
creative discourse.  That said, like discrimination, behavior that takes the form 
of harassment or bullying simply has no place on a college campus.  Thus, this 
Article urges academic institutions to raise awareness of workplace harassment 
and suggests remedial mechanisms to counteract and prevent this problem. 
INTRODUCTION 
Generally, “workplace bullying” is defined as the “intentional infliction of 
a hostile work environment upon an employee by a coworker or coworkers, 
typically through a combination of verbal and nonverbal behaviors.”9  A 
popular website on workplace bullying explains that workplace bullying 
manifests in a variety of ways, including verbal abuse, interference with work, 
or persistent conduct that threatens, humiliates, or intimidates.10  Such 
harassment may involve a single perpetrator or a group.11  It is usually typified 
by repeated negative acts intended to oppress or annoy the target.  It results in 
physical or psychological harm to the target and interferes with job 
performance.  A 2010 survey indicates that thirty-five percent (thirty-seven 
percent in 2007) of American workers have been targets of workplace 
bullying; nine percent currently are targets.12  Workplace bullying is four times 
more prevalent than workplace discrimination, which is prohibited by law.13 
Several researchers have sought to identify the characteristics of workplace 
bullies, their typical targets, and the factors that contribute to workplace 
 
 8. See Piper Fogg, Academic Bullies, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 12, 2008, at B10. 
 9. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-
Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 481 (2000). 
 10. Definition of Workplace Bullying, supra note 2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., 2010 U.S. WORKPLACE BULLYING SURVEY (2010), 
available at http://workplacebullying.org/research/2010NatlSurvey/2010_Survey_Flyer.pdf 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 BULLYING SURVEY]. 
 13. Id. 
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bullying.  One commentator attributes the increasing frequency of workplace 
bullying in America to “the growth of the service-sector economy, the global 
profit squeeze, the decline of unionization, the diversification of the workforce, 
and increased reliance on contingent workers.”14  Furthermore, in addition to 
identifying factors that contribute to workplace bullying, at least three common 
traits of the workplace bully have been identified.15  First, bullies in the 
workplace are generally men in supervisory or senior roles relative to their 
targets—a recent study suggests the breakdown is sixty-two percent men and 
thirty-eight percent women.16  Second, their goal is to limit or sabotage their 
targets’ “ability to succeed” at work.17  Third, motivated by their “own feelings 
of inadequacy,” bullies look to target “agreeable, vulnerable, and successful 
coworkers.”18  Same-gender bullying is more prevalent (sixty-eight percent); 
women bullies target women eighty percent of the time.19 
Why would a university tolerate a bully?  The obvious answer might be 
that the university is unaware of the problem.  Another might be that bullies 
are perceived as adding value, particularly in departments that harbor conflict 
and are hyper-competitive.20  After all, aggressive and underhanded behavior is 
frequently portrayed as desirable in popular culture.  Still another might be that 
the university simply views the problem as insignificant (or perhaps as one of 
deference to management prerogative or the rights of the perpetrator).  The 
likelihood of a targeted employee obtaining relief under existing law is quite 
limited, so the incentive to take action may be low. 
I.  CURRENT CASE LAW 
There is very little case law in the United States discussing workplace 
bullying.  In 2008, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Raess v. Doescher, a 
case that considered the concept of “workplace bullying.”21  The court 
 
 14. Yamada, supra note 9, at 486; see also David C. Yamada, Employment Law as if People 
Mattered: Bringing Therapeutic Jurisprudence into the Workplace, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 
257, 258–59 (2010) [hereinafter Therapeutic Jurisprudence] (suggesting that a “markets and 
management” mentality has dominated American employment law and may be responsible for 
prevalence of abusive behaviors like workplace bullying). 
 15. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 482–83. 
 16. 2010 BULLYING SURVEY, supra note 12; Yamada, supra note 9, at 482–83. 
 17. Yamada, supra note 9, at 483. 
 18. Id.  On this point, it is important to note that workplace bullying, at least in the 
theoretical context, involves how the victim felt, not what the perpetrator intended.  DARLA J. 
TWALE & BARBARA M. DE LUCA, FACULTY INCIVILITY: THE RISE OF THE ACADEMIC BULLY 
CULTURE AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 27 (2008). 
 19. 2010 BULLYING SURVEY, supra note 12. 
 20. Chaplin, supra note 3, at 442; see ROBERT I. SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE 55–56 
(2007). 
 21. Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008). 
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discussed “workplace bullying” in the context of expert testimony and a 
tendered jury instruction, although it did not have occasion to discuss 
workplace bullying as a cause of action.22  In that case, the employee (Mr. 
Doescher), filed suit against a cardiovascular surgeon (Dr. Raess), after a 
verbal altercation that took place at an Indiana hospital.23  The employee 
“sought compensatory and punitive damages for assault, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress [(“IIED”)], and tortious interference with employment.”24  
Despite the surgeon’s objections, the employee relied on the expert testimony 
of Dr. Gary Namie of the Workplace Bullying Institute to characterize the 
surgeon as a bully and to label the incident as one of workplace bullying.25  
Only the assault and IIED claims went to the jury, which in a split verdict 
awarded the employee $325,000 in compensatory damages on the assault claim 
and found in favor of the surgeon on the IIED claim.26 
On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
abused its discretion in (a) allowing Dr. Namie to testify that the surgeon was a 
workplace bully, and (b) not instructing that workplace bullying was not an 
issue in the case.27  The employee sought review of the court of appeals’s 
decision.  In reversing the court of appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court did not 
have occasion to decide whether “workplace bullying” presented a legal cause 
of action, but concluded that “workplace bullying” as a “general term[] used to 
characterize a person’s behavior, is an entirely appropriate consideration in 
determining . . . issues before the jury.”28  The court noted that even though 
“workplace bullying” was not an element of the assault claim or IIED claim, 
and even though the employee did not prevail on the IIED claim, “workplace 
bullying could be considered a form of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”29  According to the court, “workplace bullying” is a general term 
used to characterize a person’s behavior so it was relevant to the claims.30  
Moreover, a witness who was both a clinical psychologist and 
neuropsychologist, diagnosed the employee with post-traumatic stress disorder 
 
 22. Id. at 795–98. 
 23. Id. at 793.  The court of appeals decision provides context; before the altercation, the 
doctor had been concerned about perfusionist staffing and coverage issues.  Id. at 794. 
 24. Id. at 793. 
 25. Id. at 795–96. 
 26. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 793. 
 27. Raess v. Doescher, 858 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 861 N.E.2d 
1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 883 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 28. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 799. 
 29. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  A concurring opinion concluded 
that Dr. Namie’s testimony only pertained to the IIED claim.  Id. (Sullivan, J., concurring in 
result).  The conclusion that workplace bullying could be a form of IIED is supported by the few 
cases which have found in favor of employees on IIED claims based upon such conduct. 
 30. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 799. 
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and paranoid thinking, and testified that such reactions were typical of persons 
bullied in the workplace.31  The Indiana Supreme Court did not need to address 
the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Namie’s testimony given its holding of the 
lack of an adequate contemporaneous objection,32 but assuming an adequate 
objection, one member of the court would have found harmless error in 
admitting the testimony33 and another would have reversed based upon 
prejudice.34  The dissenting opinion echoes the concerns of the court of 
appeals: the testimony was of minimal probative value given the single 
incident and amounted to name-calling unhelpful to the jury because Dr. 
Namie was not qualified to say how the surgeon’s behavior affected the 
plaintiff.35  The opinions of the court of appeals and the supreme court are 
instructive because they demonstrate the issues that would confront any court 
considering workplace bullying: what are the elements of any such tort, how 
relevant is such evidence to existing torts, how should a trial court properly 
balance the admission of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice 
given the available proof, and the like. 
Another case demonstrates facts suggestive of workplace bullying, though 
the term is never used.  In Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 
the employee sought to recover from the employer and a supervisor on claims 
of prima facie tort, the tort of outrage, and IIED arising out of the supervisor’s 
conduct.36  Specifically, the employee alleged that her supervisor had engaged 
in conduct that caused severe mental harm, which resulted in her 
hospitalization in a mental health facility.37  To support her claim, the 
employee relied on evidence that she received harsh criticism from the 
supervisor and was required to retype a memo on office procedure three times 
(aimed at an error she committed at the supervisor’s direction).38  The 
employee was forced to delay her vacation when the supervisor refused to sign 
 
 31. Id. at 801–02 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
 32. Although Dr. Raess claimed that he “repeatedly objected” to Dr. Namie’s testimony at 
trial, the court held that his trial objections did not preserve his argument on appeal because he 
asserted a different argument on appeal.  Id. at 796.  On appeal, Dr. Raess argued that the trial 
court erred in allowing Dr. Namie to testify as an expert because he was not qualified under 
Indiana Rule of Evidence 702 to give scientific expert testimony.  Id.  The court explained, 
however, that “[a]t no time during his trial objections did [Dr. Raess] claim that the subject matter 
of Dr. Namie’s testimony lacked scientific reliability.”  Id. at 797.  Because “an objection on 
grounds other than those raised on appeal, is ineffective to preserve an issue for appellate 
review,” the court concluded that Dr. Raess’s appellate argument was barred by procedural 
default.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 799 (Sullivan, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 801 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
 35. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 801 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
 36. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1379 (N.M. 1994). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 1378–79. 
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a leave slip, only to appear at work and find that he had made arrangements for 
a substitute (while expressing surprise at her appearance).39  The employee’s 
claims for IIED and outrage were dismissed; however, on her claim of prima 
facie tort, the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must show 
that Defendants performed one or more intentional, lawful acts; that 
Defendants intended that the act or acts would cause harm to Plaintiff or knew 
with certainty that harm would necessarily result; that the acts did in fact 
proximately cause harm; and that Defendants’ conduct was not justifiable 
under the circumstances.40 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee, awarding her $76,000.41 
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, holding that New 
Mexico’s judicial recognition of prima facie tort was not retroactive and the 
events in question preceded that recognition.42  The employee sought review, 
and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of 
appeals and remanded on the retroactivity issue, specifically noting that it was 
not passing on the sufficiency of the evidence regarding intent to harm or lack 
of justification.43  Although the supreme court did not pass on the merits of the 
employee’s claim, it is obvious that claims for workplace harassment are not 
new and may fit under other federal and state theories, including denial of 
equal protection,44 prima facie tort, assault, workers’ compensation, and the 
like. 
II.  THE U.S. APPROACH 
The American judicial system has been reluctant to recognize a cause of 
action for workplace bullying, tending to approach the problem as a “human 
resources” issue within the workplace.45  Instead, employment law in the 
United States has focused more on providing a remedy for, and avoiding, 
discriminatory practices “against historically disempowered people” in the job 
market.46  For example, federal employment law (Title VII) prohibits 
 
 39. Id. at 1379. 
 40. Id. at 1379–80. 
 41. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1380. 
 42. Id. (citing Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 859 P.2d 497, 498 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
 43. Id. at 1378 n.2. 
 44. A state may not “omit altogether or give a diminished form of legal protection from 
verbal or physical assaults to individuals in certain disfavored classes.” Schroeder v. Hamilton 
Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (teacher claimed that 
school district denied him equal protection by treating his complaints of harassment differently 
than non-homosexual teachers). 
 45. Yamada, supra note 9, at 492. 
 46. Amanda E. Lueders, Note, You’ll Need More Than a Voltage Converter: Plugging 
European Workplace Bullying Laws into the American Jurisprudential Outlet, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
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employers from discriminating in the terms and conditions of employment 
based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”47  The Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits workplace “discriminat[ion] against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability”48 just as the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits such “discriminat[ion] 
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”49  As a result of 
these statutory provisions, a showing of “status-based harassment or 
discrimination” must be made to establish entitlement to a legal remedy.50  No 
matter how clear the harassment, it must be attributed in whole or in part to 
disparate treatment based upon gender or some other protected category.51  
Thus, cases are replete with employers claiming an “equal opportunity 
harassment” defense because the perpetrator targeted those within and without 
 
& COMP. L. 197, 202–03 (2008); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) 
(noting goal of Title VII was to provide equal employment opportunities and remove barriers to 
employment for protected classes as well as to make victims of employment discrimination 
whole). 
 47. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). 
 50. Yamada, supra note 9, at 536; Yamada, supra note 1, at 258.  These Acts also prohibit 
retaliation for reporting discrimination or engaging in activity opposed to discrimination. 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (Title VII); Crawford v. Metro. 
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850–52 (2009) (construing § 2000e-3(a)); 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (construing § 2000e-3(a)). 
 51. In Pappas v. J.S.B. Holdings, Inc., the employee complained of workplace bullying and 
harassment.  392 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2005).  In determining whether her claim for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment could survive summary judgment, the court stated: 
That the evidence of record can support a finding that [she] was repeatedly subjected to 
discourteous, boorish, mean-spirited treatment by certain of her co-workers that resulted 
in an acrimonious and frustrating work situation for her cannot be reasonably disputed.  
The issue is, however, whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to create a triable 
issue as to whether [she] was in some manner subjected to discrimination based on sex. 
Id. at 1104.  This requirement significantly limits the utility of Title VII to combat general 
workplace harassment.  See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“While [the plaintiff] may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment, he has 
not shown that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because of his gender.”); Vore v. Ind. 
Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpleasant work environment caused by 
one employee simply is not enough under Title VII without racial animus); see also Vito v. 
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 403 F. App’x 593, 595–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff’s complaints of a 
hostile work environment were at best workplace bullying devoid of discriminatory motive and 
not actionable).  Additionally, some courts decline to aggregate general harassment with the 
protected category harassment, thus the protected category harassment must be sufficiently severe 
and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.  See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 463–64 (In a 
hostile environment based on gender claim, the non-gender harassment must be “but for” the 
employee’s gender to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.). 
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protected categories.52  That said, the construct of a “hostile work 
environment,” though it must be a result of status-based discrimination, has 
obvious parallels with workplace bullying.53 
Some targets of workplace harassment have attempted to remedy instances 
of workplace bullying with such common law tort theories as prima facie tort 
or IIED.54  For example, one can recover under IIED if he or she can show the 
aggressor’s conduct “has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”55  However, courts 
have been reluctant to award damages for IIED claims in the workplace when 
they are “unrelated to sexual harassment or other forms of status-based 
discrimination.”56  Generally, IIED claims fail in cases involving workplace 
bullying because the “cases lack two of the required elements for IIED 
liability—either that the complained-of conduct was not severe or outrageous 
or that the employee did not suffer severe emotional distress.”57  Although one 
 
 52. See, e.g., Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 960 (11th Cir. 2010); Holman v. 
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 53. Under federal law, a hostile work environment claim requires membership in a protected 
group and a showing of unwelcome harassment due to the protected characteristic such as race or 
gender.  See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986); Miller v. Kenworth 
of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).  The harassment must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive 
working environment.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  This means that the 
environment would be reasonably perceived as hostile (objective component) and was so 
perceived by the plaintiff (subjective component).  Id. at 21–22.  Finally, the facts must suggest 
direct or vicarious liability for the employer.  See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 
764–65 (1998) (discussing employer liability and potential defenses); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (same). 
 54. Yamada, supra note 9, at 493. 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts illustrates the tort of IIED as involving “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”  Id. § 46. 
 56. Yamada, supra note 9, at 494; see also Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 586 
(5th Cir. 2006) (applying Mississippi law and noting that employment disputes are rarely viable 
IIED claims); Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(IIED direct liability sustained based upon “outrageous discriminatory conduct”); Nijem v. Alsco, 
Inc., No. 3:10-00221, 2011 WL 2490748, at *16 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2011) (finding that 
employment discrimination claims are rarely accompanied by sufficiently outrageous conduct to 
support an IIED claim). 
 57. Yamada, supra note 9 at 494; see, e.g., Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 
376 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that employer’s conduct was not outrageous, even if based on 
discrimination); see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 257 (noting employment-related IIED 
plaintiffs often fail to allege the requisite level of extreme and outrageous conduct and emotional 
distress).  Even assuming that a plaintiff has a viable IIED claim, such common law tort claims 
often are barred by the exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation statutes, which generally 
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commentator has suggested that removing tort-law barriers to workplace 
harassment claims is preferable to a statutory approach,58 modifying tort law 
one court at a time would be an enormous undertaking given the relative 
infrequency that courts overrule precedent. 
For example, in Herrera v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., a federal district court 
ruled that the defendant’s repeated references to the plaintiff as “the Mexican,” 
among other racially motivated acts, were not sufficient to establish a claim of 
IIED.59  The Tenth Circuit affirmed, despite its determination that there was a 
“triable issue as to whether [the defendant] created a racially hostile work 
environment actionable under Title VII.”60  The court concluded that “only the 
most egregious conduct” is actionable under IIED.61  Thus, it seems that a 
plaintiff alleging IIED in an employment situation may face a higher hurdle 
than one who claims merely under protected-class status.62  Another difficulty 
is that statutory employment discrimination claims may be the exclusive 
remedy when the alleged discrimination is based upon protected status.63  
 
provide that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries arising in the course of 
employment.  E.g., Hibben v. Nardone, 137 F.3d 480, 483–84 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 Although one would hope it would be nonexistent, the academic context may involve a 
faculty member bullying certain students.  In Smith v. Atkins, the court affirmed a defamation 
verdict against a law school professor based upon his harassment of a student.  622 So. 2d 795, 
796 (La. Ct. App. 1993).  The court not only affirmed the defamation verdict, but also concluded 
that the student had suffered IIED and increased the damage award to $5,000 from $1,500.  Id. at 
800.  On the other hand, a different court held that allegations that an instructor interfered with a 
student’s educational plans by revoking pre-approved credits were insufficient to state an IIED 
claim.  Britt v. Chestnut Hill Coll., 632 A.2d 557, 558, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  Likewise, the 
termination of a tenured professor without due process or a hearing was insufficient for an IIED 
claim, but did merit a denial of qualified immunity insofar as the denial of due process.  Newman 
v. Kock, 274 S.W.3d 697, 701–02, 707–08 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 58. Sarah Morris, The Anti-Bullying Legislative Movement: Too Quick to Quash Common 
Law Remedies, 65 BENCH & B. OF MINN., Nov. 2008, at 22, 25. 
 59. Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 687–88 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 60. Id. at 688; see also Clemente v. State, 206 P.3d 249, 255 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“In every 
case in which this court or the Supreme Court has allowed an IIED claim asserted in the context 
of an employment relationship to proceed to a jury, the employer engaged in conduct that was not 
only aggravating, insensitive, petty, irritating, perhaps unlawful, and mean—it also contained 
some further and more serious aspect.” (footnote and citation omitted)). 
 61. Herrera, 474 F.3d at 688. 
 62. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 503. 
 63. See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816, 818 (Tex. 2005) (explaining that 
IIED is a gap-filler tort and that an IIED claim was not independent of the state human rights act); 
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. 2004) (determining IIED 
claim was not independent of state human rights act claim and could not support an award of 
damages in excess of statutory cap in the act); see also Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 
S.W.3d 796, 802–04 (Tex. 2010) (holding that assault, negligent supervision, and retention claims 
seeking to hold an employer liable are preempted by a tailored statutory scheme).  Given that 
bullying claims often will be paired with federal Title VII and state human rights act claims, IIED 
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Because of the lack of legal remedies, employment lawyers may be reluctant to 
represent or advise targets of harassment unless protected-class discrimination 
is involved.64 
III.  STUDENT BULLYING AND THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 
Courts in the United States have declined to recognize a cause of action for 
targets of an abusive work environment beyond what has already been 
established by statute and the common law.  Thus, federal and state law 
generally prohibit employment discrimination based upon protected status.65  
While no jurisdiction has enacted a workplace bullying statute, most 
jurisdictions (thirty-nine states) have enacted statutory provisions ranging from 
requiring school districts to study and formulate a policy to address student-on-
student bullying, to prohibiting of all forms of bullying and retaliation for 
reporting it.66  These acts usually define bullying and implicitly have dealt with 
 
claims may be foreclosed.  See Williamson v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 431, 457 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010).  From this, it seems a logical argument that any common law tort for workplace 
bullying would be preempted by statutory remedies for employment discrimination. 
 64. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 281. 
 65. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 66. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200, 14.33.210 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
341(A)(37) (Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-
109.1(2)(a)(X), (b)(VIII) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 
4112D (2007); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 33-512(6) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27-23.7 (2010) (prohibition of bullying); IND. 
CODE § 20-33-8-13.5 (2007); IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (Supp. 
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.17 (Supp. 2011) (elementary school program that may 
address bullying); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1001(15)(H) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. 
§§ 7-424, 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (Supp. 2010); MINN. 
STAT. § 121A.0695 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
2,137 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388.122–.123, 388.132–.135, 388.139 (2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to F:6 (Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-13 to -17 (West Supp. 
2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to .18 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22, 
3313.666–.667 (Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.2 to -100.5 (Supp. 2010); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 339.351–.364 (2009); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West Supp. 2011); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 59-63-110 to -160 (Supp. 2010); TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 49-6-1014 to -1019 (2009); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001(a)(7) (West 2006 & 
Supp. 2010), 37.083 (West 2006), 25.0342 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 
53A-11a-102 to -402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2006); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11(a)(32), 165(a)(1), 565 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.300.285, 
28A.600.480 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); 
WISC. STAT. § 118.46 (2009–10); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -315 (2011). 
  These statutes certainly reflect the sentiment that no student should be subject to 
harassment at the hands of school faculty, staff, or peers.  Why that sentiment has not manifested 
itself in legislation to protect employees in the workplace is an obvious question.  Some reasons 
for the difference in protection may be that (1) elementary and secondary students are in a captive 
environment given compulsory school attendance, (2) the state acts in a parens patriae capacity 
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many issues that would arise in drafting a workplace harassment statute.  They 
are certainly important as potential resources in drafting anti-harassment 
statutes in their respective states.67  That said, it is doubtful that these 
provisions create a cause of action.68  On the federal front, the Office of Civil 
Rights of the Department of Education has provided guidance in the form of a 
“Dear Colleague” letter sent to universities and schools as to when student-on-
student bullying may violate federal civil rights law, the legal obligation to 
protect students in protected categories, and examples of appropriate responses 
in certain situations.69  Federal legislation has been introduced that would 
require school entities to develop policies and programs to prevent and respond 
to bullying and harassment.70  A real concern is that the latest of such measures 
 
over those students, and (3) such student targets are less able to fend for themselves than adult 
workers.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that these factors may justify a greater level of 
control than would be permissible over adults.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 
2626–27 (2007) (First Amendment); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) 
(Fourth Amendment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (First 
Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985) (Fourth Amendment); Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (First Amendment).  Indeed, 
courts have long differentiated between permissible regulation of expression in the elementary 
and secondary context and the smaller amount allowed in a university setting.  E.g., McCauley v. 
Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2010).  Although there are free expression 
concerns, those advocating a legislative response to bullying in the public schools may have been 
more successful characterizing it as a public health issue.  Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 
14, at 287. 
 67. The Secretary of Education recently offered technical assistance to entities seeking to 
craft laws or policies to reduce student-on-student bullying.  Policy Letter from Arne Duncan, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Governors & Chief State School Officers (Dec. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html.  Attached was a 
summary of key components of such a policy and examples of state-law provisions.  Id. 
enclosure. 
 68. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.364 (2009) (no cause of action created); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 16-21-26(l) (Supp. 2010) (same); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 59-63-150(A) (Supp. 2010) (same); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 53A-11a-402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-315 
(2011) (same). 
 69. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office 
of Civil Rights, to colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html.  The question of whether an institution’s response 
should be grounded in a view of bullying as a generally unacceptable behavior or based upon the 
specific actual or perceived characteristics of the victim has created some controversy.  One 
group, taking the former position, advocates for a model policy at the state or local level omitting 
mention of protected categories and incorporating limits consistent with First Amendment 
protection of verbal expression.  Letter from Brian Raum, Austin R. Nimocks & Daniel 
Blomberg, Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund, to Martin R. Castro, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on 
Civil Rights, ex. 1, Model Anti-Bullying Policy §§ II(A), III, V (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/USCCRbullyingpolicy.pdf. 
 70. Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2011, S. 506, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Safe Schools 
Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1648, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Tyler Clementi Higher Education 
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does not contain an objective component and could restrict speech; the 
Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX as proscribing student-on-student 
harassment where the harassment is not only severe and pervasive, but also 
objectively offensive so as to deprive a student of equal access to education.71 
The approach to enacting these measures is largely based upon promoting 
student health and safety (as well as promoting equal educational opportunity), 
a lesson that is not lost on those favoring enactment of a statutory response to 
workplace harassment, often called a “healthy workplace law.”72  Though 
health and safety law in the United States largely protects against physical 
hazards and injuries, it has been slow to recognize that workplace harassment 
may involve both physical and psychological harm.73  Many other Western 
nations have enacted statutes to protect workers from workplace bullying.74  
Many countries in Europe, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, 
Germany, Belgium, and Poland, have adopted some form of “anti-bullying” 
legislation.75  Additionally, Canada has recognized the detrimental effects of 
bullying in the workplace and has amended its Labour Code to require 
employers to develop workplace-violence-prevention policies, which provide 
 
Ant-Harassment Act of 2011, S. 540, 112th  Cong. § 2 (2011); Tyler Clementi Higher Education 
Anti-Harassment Act of 2011, H.R. 1048, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); see also Bullying Prevention 
and Intervention Act of 2011, H.R. 83, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Anti-Bullying and Harassment 
Act of 2011, H.R. 975, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 71. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).  A plaintiff pursuing a 
private action for damages also must show that the educational unit acted with deliberate 
indifference, a very high standard of proof.  Id.  A plaintiff also may pursue a federal civil rights 
claim based upon a violation of equal protection; Title IX is not an exclusive remedy.  Fitzgerald 
v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009).  For disabled students, another theory may 
be relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act where the harassment is likely to 
affect the student’s opportunity for an appropriate education.  T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 779 
F. Supp. 2d 289, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).  It seems clear that any statute concerning harassment 
which limits the expressive content of speech must comport with the First Amendment.  See 
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 
200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001).  Such restrictions in the public school setting might be justified on 
any number of rationales, including that the speech (1) interferes with the rights of other students, 
(2) would substantially disrupt school operations, (3) would bear the imprimatur of the school and 
is contrary to legitimate pedagogical concerns, or (4) advocates unlawful activity (including 
harassment).  See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626–27; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211–14. 
 72. See Yamada, supra note 1, at 278 (“We must put, front and center, the fact that 
workplace bullying is a form of health-endangering psychological abuse.”). 
 73. David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
523, 564–65 (2009). 
 74. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 207–10 (describing various Western nations’ legislative 
responses to workplace bullying). 
 75. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 150–153; Lueders, supra note 46, at 207–210. 
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protection from workplace bullying.76  Though each country’s approach varies, 
global recognition of the problem as one involving public health is emerging. 
An important case from the United Kingdom resulted in a Deutsche Bank 
employee receiving an award of £800,000 as a result of a “workplace bullying” 
action.77  Under the United Kingdom’s Protection from Harassment Act, Helen 
Green sued Deutsche Bank, her employer, for her coworkers’ harassing acts.78  
Specifically, Ms. Green alleged that her coworkers frustrated her ability to 
work by “moving her papers . . . hiding her mail, removing her from document 
circulation lists, [and] ignoring and excluding her.”79  Ms. Green also produced 
evidence that her workload increased unreasonably and that her coworkers 
laughed at and made rude comments about her.80  As a result, Ms. Green fell 
into depression and sought counseling.81  In 2006, a British court ruled in favor 
of Ms. Green, holding Deutsche Bank vicariously liable for the actions of its 
employees.82 
IV.  ACADEMIC HARASSMENT 
Bullying or harassment encompasses a multitude of verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors ranging from the impolite to the truly disrespectful.83  Academic 
harassment can take many forms, from more overt aggressive behavior 
directed towards a colleague including name-calling, rude expressions and 
gestures, and intimidation, to the less overt, including circulating damaging 
rumors and attempting to undermine a colleague’s career through official and 
unofficial actions.  Although one commonly thinks of harassment as 
affirmative acts of aggression, another distinction is helpful: “aggressor bullies 
and victim bullies.”84  By way of example, the aggressor bully might be a dean 
who threatens to increase teaching loads unless the faculty subscribes to a new 
vision of applied research, at the expense of ongoing research.  It could be a 
mid-level administrator who withholds teaching assignments and locations for 
the adjunct faculty until immediately prior to the start of the term as a means of 
 
 76. Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (Violence Prevention in the Work 
Place), SOR/86-304, § 20.3. 
 77. Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 17 MINN. 
J. INTL. L. 247, 284 (2008); Green v. DB Group Servs. (UK) Ltd., [2006] EWHC 1898 (Q.B). 
 78. Harthill, supra note 77, at 284–85. 
 79. Id. at 284. 
 80. Id. at 284–85. 
 81. Id. at 247–48. 
 82. Id. at 284. 
 83. See SUTTON, supra note 20, at 10 (listing “The Dirty Dozen” actions used by harassers); 
Christopher S. Simon & Denise B. Simon, Bully for You; Full Steam Ahead: How Pennsylvania 
Employment Law Permits Bullying in the Workplace, 16 WIDENER L.J. 141, 143–45 (2006) 
(listing 44 behaviors). 
 84. C.K. GUNSALUS, THE COLLEGE ADMINISTRATOR’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 123 (2006). 
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control.  It could be a colleague who glares at another when no one else is 
around, but is cordial if others are near.  It could be a colleague who practices 
bullying within a discipline, targeting those with research points of view out of 
favor with the general community and undermining their work.  In contrast, the 
victim bully might be a faculty member who constantly pressures for various 
perquisites because he is a “star” and he perceives that the powers that be have 
bestowed some inequity upon him.  This bully is high maintenance and may 
enjoy conflict.  That said, and remembering the importance of the victim or 
target’s perspective, it is doubtful that the latter conduct would constitute 
actionable harassment without more. 
Though it is impossible to catalogue all of the behaviors that might 
comprise academic harassment, a bully in the academic context crosses the line 
into uncivilized behavior where others would be inhibited.85  Of course, 
everyone has the potential to depart from civility, particularly when under 
pressure.  Thus, it is important to emphasize that academic harassment is 
characterized not by isolated incidents, but rather by consistently negative 
interactions. 
Several factors unique to the academic environment may allow such 
harassment to go unchecked.  First, the academic environment is difficult for a 
newcomer to break into (a department may have members that have interacted 
for years) and it is rare that expectations concerning standards of civility are 
communicated consistently.  Second, academic institutions are decentralized 
organizations and monitoring of professional day-to-day behavior is rare.86  
Third, given the inner-directed nature of most academic activities, it is often 
far easier to ignore such a problem than to deal with it.  For most employees, a 
natural human tendency is to avoid conflict rather than confront it.  Fourth, an 
academic may belong to several work groups—including a department, 
college, governance committees, as well as discipline-related professional 
entities—and simply may not have the time or inclination to deal with a 
problem.  Fifth, academic success is largely an individual effort—successful 
research and teaching, while at times collaborative, depend upon sustained, 
individual effort, and a faculty member may still be able to perform 
notwithstanding the harassment.  Sixth, the larger concepts of academic 
freedom and collegiality often cause colleagues to accept a wide range of 
professional demeanor.87  Seventh, many in academic administrative roles are 
there only for a short time and have little managerial experience.88  Finally, an 
 
 85. Id. at 122. 
 86. See id. at 124. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Kenneth W. Borland, The Relationship Between Faculty and Academic Administration 
in Governance Functions, in 4 EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 89 (Michael T. 
Miller & Julie Caplow eds., 2003) (discussing the brief tenures of academic administrators); 
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academic enterprise has a very hierarchical structure (full professor, associate 
professor, assistant professor, lecturer, and adjunct professor), and those of 
lesser rank are often dependent upon those of higher rank and unwilling to 
confront bad behavior for fear of retaliation.89  For example, a full or associate 
professor may be instrumental in tenure decisions concerning assistant 
professors, or a department chair may decide the terms and conditions under 
which lecturers and adjunct professors work, including course assignments, 
course load, and compensation. 
At the same time, several factors suggest that such harassment is a “low-
incidence, high-severity” problem in the academic context.90  First, most 
faculty members have experienced other institutions of higher learning and are 
aware of acceptable conduct.  Particularly in hiring, most departments seek to 
avoid difficult colleagues with whom they may have to work for many years.91  
Second, taking the longer view, faculty members cooperate knowing that they 
must work with others given the various committees and task forces that 
accomplish the academic mission and governance of the institution.  Taking 
the shorter view, the academic workforce is highly qualified and mobile; most 
academic personnel have options (though that may be changing in an era of 
reduced public funding for higher education) should a situation become 
intolerable due to harassment.  Third, even given some harassment, the time 
spent interacting with any one academic may be limited, particularly for those 
not in senior or administrative roles.  Moreover, the academic environment is 
often fluid (deans and department chairs do change) so harassment may be a 
short-term phenomenon.  Fourth, an academic career offers a great deal of 
autonomy with reference to an external discipline.  This may deter the harasser 
or at least provide a network of support for the target. 
Without question, harassment can have a destructive effect on the 
academic environment.  Often the harasser will be largely unsupervised and 
free to inflict harm.92  A new faculty member certainly will have many 
challenges and demands on his or her time; dealing with a bully should not be 
one of them.93  The energy needed to deal with a harasser may affect 
 
Michael A. Fitts, The Non-Management Side of Academic Administration, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 
283, 283 (2010) (noting academic administrators’ frequent lack of traditional management 
experience). 
 89. In this regard, a test for bad behavior particularly in the academic context might be 
whether the person “aim[s] his or her venom at people who are less powerful rather than at those 
people who are more powerful?”  SUTTON, supra note 20, at 9. 
 90. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 124. 
 91. SUTTON, supra note 20, at 2. 
 92. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 122–23. 
 93. For example, in Recio v. Evers, a tenured professor was placed on probation and required 
to attend counseling based upon a complaint by a newly-hired professor that the tenured professor 
sent her a string of demanding e-mails that appeared to have a sexual content.  771 N.W.2d 121, 
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productivity, the safety of the workplace and the employee’s physical and 
mental well-being, as well as institutional integrity.94  Preventive and 
educational efforts may yield better results than waiting for such conduct to 
occur.95 
V.  PROPOSED RESPONSES 
Much debate exists about the most effective way to combat bullying in the 
American workplace.  Those who seek an end to “workplace bullying” propose 
a statutory solution, similar to laws enacted in other countries, which would 
promote “prevention, self-help, compensation, and punishment.”96  One 
proposal is a cause of action called “intentional infliction of a hostile work 
environment,” which would require a plaintiff to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant employer, its 
agent, or both, intentionally subjected the plaintiff to a hostile work 
environment.  A hostile work environment is one that is deemed hostile by 
both the plaintiff and by a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation.  
Employers are to be held vicariously liable for hostile work environments 
intentionally created by their agents.97 
Such an approach would incorporate both a subjective and objective evaluation 
of the allegedly hostile conduct consistent with federal law.  The subjective 
element would require a plaintiff to believe that a defendant’s conduct was the 
cause of, or contributed to, the creation of a hostile work environment, while 
the reasonable person standard would discourage frivolous claims.98  
Furthermore, the reasonable person standard would permit recovery for a broad 
 
129–30 (Neb. 2009).  The tenured professor was described by those in the department as 
“obsessive, a bully, aggressive, irrational, . . . demanding, creates conflict, stalking, retaliates, 
rages, verbal violence, explosive, forceful and creates a hostile work environment.”  Id. at 130.  
An acrimonious department meeting, years after the e-mails, precipitated the complaint; the court 
noted that the record made it clear that department members “did not get along with one another.”  
Id. at 129.  The tenured professor sued the junior professor for interference with a business 
relationship, but the court held that the sexual harassment complaint was truthful and therefore 
could not be the basis such a claim.  Id. at 137. 
 94. See GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE, THE BULLY AT WORK 11 (2000).  In Yancick v. 
Hanna Steel Corp., the Seventh Circuit considered a claim in a federal race-discrimination case 
that a co-employee intentionally caused an industrial accident severely injuring the target.  No. 
10-1368, 2011 WL 3319568, at *14 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 2011).  The court determined that the co-
employee “was an equal opportunity bully” (rather than one motivated by race) and concluded 
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the accident was racially motivated.  Id. at *14–15.  
Still, the case stands out as another reminder of the limits of federal anti-discrimination law and 
the danger a bully may pose in the workplace. 
 95. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 125. 
 96. Yamada, supra note 9, at 524. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
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range of abuses rather than limiting the cause of action only to statutorily 
defined behaviors.99  Relief under such an approach would reflect the 
compensation and punishment goals of the statute.100  Damages likely would 
be modeled on those available under employment discrimination statutes, 
which “allow for back pay, front pay, reinstatement, punitive damages, and 
injunctive relief.”101  Where an employee does not suffer any tangible adverse 
employment actions (such as discharge or demotion), an employer may defend 
on the basis that it took steps to prevent or promptly correct the harassment and 
the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage.102  Significantly, the 
defense would be only available to the employer; co-workers and supervisors 
who perpetrated the harassment still could be sued.103 
Another proposal—the Model Healthy Workplace Bill104—makes it 
unlawful to subject an employee to an abusive work environment and provides 
for vicarious liability for an employer,105 though it is apparent that both 
employers and employees can be defendants.106  An abusive work environment 
occurs when a defendant, acting with malice, subjects an employee to abusive 
conduct so severe that it causes psychological or physical harm that is 
documented or supported by expert evidence.107  Requiring malice and tangible 
harm are the primary means of deterring marginal claims.108  Still, the 
definitions are broad: conduct includes acts and omissions, and while abusive 
conduct must be unrelated to an employer’s legitimate interests, it includes 
“repeated infliction of verbal abuse such as the use of derogatory remarks, 
insults, and epithets; verbal or physical conduct that a reasonable person would 
find threatening, intimidating, or humiliating; or the gratuitous sabotage or 
undermining of a person’s work performance.”109  Whether abusive conduct 
has been shown depends upon the “severity, nature, and frequency of the 
defendant’s conduct,” though a single act may be deemed such conduct if 
 
 99. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 230. 
 100. Yamada, supra note 9, at 528–29. 
 101. Id. at 528. 
 102. Id. at 527–28. 
 103. Id. at 528. 
 104. David C. Yamada, Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. 
& EMP. POL’Y J. 475 app. (2004). 
 105. Id. app. §§ 3–4. 
 106. Id. app. § 7(2) (limiting employer liability in certain circumstances and explaining 
section does not apply to “individually named co-employee defendants”). 
 107. Id. app. §§ 2(3), (3)(c)–(d); see also id. at 500 (discussing the subjective prong of the 
Healthy Workplace Bill). 
 108. Yamada, supra note 1, at 262, 269.  The Bill does not require a plaintiff to prove a 
subjective perception of abuse, instead relying upon the requirement of tangible harm which most 
likely encompasses such a perception.  Id. at 263. 
 109. Yamada, supra note 104, app. §§ 2(3), (3)(a), (3)(c). 
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“especially severe and egregious.”110  The Bill contains traditional affirmative 
defenses under employment discrimination law involving actions other than 
adverse employment actions: an employer will not be liable where the 
employer took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the actionable 
behavior and where the targeted employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of such opportunities.111  Another affirmative defense is where the 
employer takes an adverse action against an employee based on legitimate 
business interests, such as performance issues, or reasonably investigates 
potentially unlawful or unethical activity.112  The Bill is enforced by a private 
right of action (without any administrative prerequisite to proceeding in state 
court) and provides a one-year limitation period from the last act of the 
harassment.113  Relief reflects the goals of compensation and deterrence, and 
includes injunction, removal of the perpetrator from the work environment, 
reinstatement, back pay, front pay, medical expenses, emotional distress 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.114 
In the United States, legislation to combat workplace harassment has been 
introduced in twenty-one states, but none has been adopted as law.115  
Advocates of such legislation base their proposals on the Model Healthy 
Workplace Bill,116 discussed above, which creates a private right of action for 
victims of workplace harassment.  The cause of action would expand 
employment harassment protections to non-protected status classes, thereby 
filling a gap in federal and state civil rights protections.117  The Bill contains a 
definition of an “abusive workplace” and the requirement that a claimant 
 
 110. Id. app. § 2(3)(c). 
 111. Id. app. § 5(A); see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing one of the affirmative 
defenses available under the Bill). 
 112. Yamada, supra note 104, app. § 5(B). 
 113. Id. app. § 8. 
 114. Id. app. § 7. 
 115. Healthy Workplace Bill: Legislative History in the United States, NEW YORK HEALTHY 
WORKPLACE ADVOCATES, http://www.nyhwa.org/7.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  The states 
include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id.  The New York senate passed a 
Healthy Workplace Bill, but the bill did not make it out of the state assembly.  See Adam Cohen, 
New Laws Target Workplace Bullying, TIME (July 21, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,2005358,00.html?xid=rss-fullnation-yahoo. 
 116. Lueders, supra note 46, at 227; see also Quick Facts About the Healthy Workplace Bill, 
HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL, http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/bill.php#facts (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2011) (providing a description and overview of the Model Healthy Workplace Bill).  For 
an example of a bill introduced, see A. 673, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A1000/673_I1.pdf. 
 117. Quick Facts About the Health Workplace Bill, supra note 116. 
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provide medically acknowledged proof of harm to health.118  This may include 
physical or psychological damages.119  In theory, the act attempts to protect 
both employees and employers who have adopted policies to combat abusive 
workplaces.120 
In contrast, critics of a workplace-harassment act claim it will increase 
frivolous litigation and employer liability.121  The availability of such claims is 
tantamount to more regulation of employers.  Critics also fear that such vague 
legislation would provide little guidance to potential defendants, who can 
include employers as well as employees.122  They argue that the workplace is a 
self-correcting entity,123 in that at-will employment allows victimized 
employees to terminate their contracts as soon as “the net value of the 
employment contract turns negative.”124  As a result, the market self-corrects 
because bad employers who suffer losses are forced to correct these problems 
internally, and good employees are drawn to employers with good reputations, 
who then prosper.125  Critics also point to the public awareness of the harms of 
workplace harassment and suggest that internal prevention efforts, including an 
anti-harassment policy with clear outcomes, may yield better results.126 
It seems clear that state adoption of a Model Healthy Workplace Bill 
would work a significant change in the employment area in terms of access to 
the courts and liability for individual defendants.127  First, under federal anti-
discrimination law, an employee must file an administrative charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 or 300 
days (depending upon the state) after the unlawful employment practice 
occurs.128  The purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement is to 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 286. 
 120. See Quick Facts About the Healthy Workplace Bill, supra note 116 (enumerating the 
Healthy Workplace Bill’s attempts to protect both parties). 
 121. Yamada, supra note 9, at 532–33. 
 122. Lueders, supra note 46, at 236; Victoria Pynchon, New York Anti-Bullying Law A Big 
Bad Idea, ON THE DOCKET: INSIDE THE COURTROOM (May 28, 2010, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2010/05/28/new-york-anti-bullying-law-a-big-bad-idea/. 
 123. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 532. 
 124. Id. (quoting Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
947, 966 (1984)). 
 125. See id.  Thus, an employer could conceivably adopt an anti-harassment policy that could 
modify an at-will employment arrangement.  See, e.g., Baker v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., No. 
06-cv-01103-PSF-BNB, 2007 WL 4287494, at *12–13 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2007). 
 126. See supra note 6 (describing the Society for Human Resource Management’s criticism of 
pending anti-bullying legislation). 
 127. Brian K. LaFratta, Crackdown on Bullies: Bills in Several States Would Give Employees 
Tools to Fight Abusive Conduct in the Workplace, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at S1. 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 
118 (2002). 
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allow the EEOC to investigate and attempt conciliation.129  If the matter is not 
resolved administratively, the employee receives a notice of a right to sue in 
federal court.130  Contrast that with a state cause of action that would require 
no administrative exhaustion and may be pursued directly in state court pro 
se.131  This could be a definite advantage to employees, as federal courts are 
perceived as being more formal and more complex for litigation.132 
State courts also may be less likely to grant summary judgment or 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of employer defendants than federal 
courts.133  And of course, federal anti-discrimination claims have caps on 
damages based on employer size.134  The model act caps employer liability at 
$25,000 per unlawful employment practice (with no punitive damages) for 
emotional distress damages in the absence of an adverse employment decision; 
given an adverse employment decision, the damages could be unlimited.135  
The model act also may bring in more defendants (employer and harasser 
employees) whereas under federal law, it is the employer that is sued.136 
 
 129. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see, e.g.,  Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44, 47; McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). 
 131. Of course, states have anti-discrimination statutes also, but probably require 
administrative exhaustion. 
 132. Oddly enough, the lack of an administrative mechanism in the Bill is designed to 
discourage weak claims by denying agency representation to pro se litigants and by making the 
plaintiff’s bar a gatekeeper—those with weak cases will find it difficult to obtain an attorney. 
Yamada, supra note 104, at 505; see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 266 (discussing the Bill’s 
enforceability by private right of action).  This rationale seems counter-intuitive given that 
plaintiffs are certainly able to file pro se. 
 133. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
517, 522, 522–23 nn.25–26 (2010) (describing the perception that state courts are more favorable 
to plaintiffs and federal courts are more favorable to defendants in such situations).  Since 1986, 
federal courts have been encouraged to use summary judgment to eliminate factually unsupported 
claims.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–51 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325–26 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  Likewise, recent case law encourages federal courts to grant motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim where the complaint states merely a conceivable claim, not a 
plausible one.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court will take a 
complaint’s factual allegations as true in deciding whether it meets the “plausibility test,” but not 
its legal conclusions.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).  The caps on compensatory and punitive damages range 
from $50,000 to $300,000 depending upon the employer’s number of employees.  Id. 
 135. Yamada, supra note 104, app. § 7(2). 
 136. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting that 
the retaliatory provision of Title VII does not allow for individual liability); Fantini v. Salem 
State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 28–31 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding there is no individual employee liability 
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How would such a measure affect the academic environment?  As a 
starting point, many institutions have adopted the American Association of 
University Professors’ (AAUP) statement of professional ethics, which 
proscribes harassment or discriminatory treatment of colleagues and 
students.137  As with most work environments, differentiating workplace 
harassment from legitimate performance-related judgments and managerial 
prerogative is essential.  An academic environment is all about knowledge 
creation and this involves content-based choices and criticism that might be 
mistaken for harassment.  Conflict based upon competing ideas is often part of 
the creative process; conflict based upon relentless personal attacks is not.138  
Additionally, academia comprises many diverse personalities, and styles of 
interaction certainly differ.  Tolerance is essential; colleagues do not have to 
like one another.  But, if the internal dissension proves too much and the 
research and teaching mission is compromised, a university may intervene 
notwithstanding the personal positions of the faculty.139  Of course, the 
university must do so consistent with First Amendment concerns and the due 
process rights of the tenured faculty.140 
 
under Title VII); Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that 
a Title VII claim may not be brought against an individual employee). 
 137. Statement on Professional Ethics, in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY 
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 171, 171–72 (10th ed. 2006). 
 138. Yamada, supra note 1, at 270 (rejecting the idea “that malicious, psychological abuse of 
an employee is all part of healthy competition, a form of social Darwinism that separates the 
wheat from the chaff and frees people to excel”). 
 139. See Webb v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ., 167 F.3d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that universities may intervene when tensions become overwhelming). 
 140. Thus, in Hulen v. Yates, four members of an accounting and taxation department at a 
state university were transferred to different departments after being warned that efforts to revoke 
a colleague’s tenure might be met with adverse action.  322 F.3d 1229, 1233 & n.1 (10th Cir. 
2003) (per curiam).  The plaintiff had tenure and taught tax, but was transferred to the 
management department and only allowed to teach two tax classes per year.  Id. at 1233.  The 
Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff had a property interest in his departmental assignment 
entitling him to due process, which he received, but remanded the case for a trial on his First 
Amendment retaliation claims.  Id. at 1243–44, 1249.  Although the court determined that the 
plaintiff spoke out on a matter of public concern and his interests in speaking out were not 
outweighed by the university’s interest in departmental harmony, id. at 1238–39, the case 
predates Garcetti v. Ceballos which held that public employee speech pursuant to official duties 
is not protected under the First Amendment, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
  In a somewhat similar case, an accounting department faculty member was relieved from 
teaching responsibilities after complaints of negative and disruptive behavior by colleagues.  
DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2009).  The faculty member claimed 
retaliation based upon his complaints to the accreditation body (AACSB) and denial of a liberty 
and property interest in his employment.  Id. at 286.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
university president was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim 
because the law was not clearly established that being relieved of teaching duties (while 
maintaining tenure, salary, and rank) constituted adverse action.  Id. at 287–88.  The court also 
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A larger concern is not to compromise academic freedom with minor or 
groundless complaints.  Faculty members are entitled to freedom in teaching, 
research and publication, and speaking out as citizens without fear of adverse 
employment action.141  This professional conception of academic freedom also 
may enjoy some constitutional protection.142  Accordingly, some leeway 
concerning faculty conduct is necessary to protect academic freedom and give 
it sufficient breathing room.143  Professional disagreements can get quite 
heated, but at what point does pressing an issue constitute harassment?  
Likewise, faculty appointments on the tenure track require critical judgment 
that could easily be deemed unjustified or abusive by an unsuccessful 
candidate.144  Of course, academic freedom has always carried with it a 
professional responsibility for ethical behavior in performing research, 
publication, and teaching functions.145  Likewise, it should carry a 
responsibility not to engage in repeated, destructive, and discriminatory 
conduct aimed at a colleague or other university constituents.146 
Some limits probably are essential.  Federal law is replete with the maxim 
that the purpose of anti-discrimination law is not to create a general civility 
code.147  And with good reason—such a code would be difficult to enforce and 
could very well chill expression.148  Additionally, Title VII was never intended 
 
concluded that the action could not support a due process claim as the faculty member did not 
have a property interest in specific duties without a contractual or statutory provision to the 
contrary.  Id. at 289–90. 
 141. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. 
PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3, 3 (10th ed. 2006). 
 142. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 143. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 144. Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Faculty Experiences with Bullying in Higher 
Education: Causes, Consequences, and Management, 32 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 48, 56 
(2010); see, e.g., Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(regarding the non-reappointment of assistant professor in fifth year).  Academic freedom 
concerning appointment of faculty is probably the area where courts defer most—so it may well 
be that courts would continue to do so even given a new tort of workplace harassment. 
 145. William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue 
of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 
1975); see Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
university’s interest in the integrity of its intellectual mission and research outweighed teaching 
assistant’s interest in presenting fabricated data). 
 146. See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 881–83, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that assistant 
professor’s demeaning comments were not entitled to First Amendment protection); Robert J. 
Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the Application of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 154 (2009) (noting that abusive 
behavior in an academic setting is not entitled to First Amendment protection). 
 147. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 148. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 285–86. 
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to turn courts into a “super-personnel department.”149  Hence, under federal 
law, the harassment must be severe or pervasive enough so as to alter the terms 
and conditions of the victim’s employment.150  There also is a subjective and 
an objective component—not only must the harassment be perceived as such 
by the complaining individual, but a reasonable person would also have the 
same perception.151  This inquiry is based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the harassment, whether 
it is threatening or humiliating, and whether it interferes with job 
performance.152 
The Tenth Circuit recently considered two faculty members’ claims of 
retaliation for reporting discrimination.  In Somoza v. University of Denver, the 
court determined that the faculty members could not prove that a reasonable 
person would have been dissuaded from reporting discrimination, an objective 
requirement under federal law.153  The court suggested that the faculty 
members “may have had to withstand colleagues that do not like them, are 
rude, and may be generally disagreeable people,” but the court could not 
“mandate that certain individuals work on their interpersonal skills and cease 
engaging in inter-departmental personality conflicts.”154  While not trivializing 
the subjective discomfort, the court held that “various instances of incivility, 
rudeness, and allegedly offensive statements regarding their ethnicity and 
national origin” simply were not enough under the objective test.155  The case 
is instructive because it involves typical department strife—faculty hiring, 
interaction among members, and resource allocation. 
Another recurring issue is vicarious liability: in what circumstances should 
the academic institution be liable for the conduct of the harasser when the 
employee has suffered no tangible employment action (e.g., demotion or loss 
of pay)?  Current law allows the institution an affirmative defense to liability 
and damages, given a hostile work environment created by a supervisor, when 
the institution can prove it took prompt corrective action when informed of the 
problem and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of measures 
designed to prevent the harassment.156  Such policies encourage institutions to 
adopt and educate employees about internal protocol for handling and 
resolving such claims. 
 
 149. Downing v. Tapella, 729 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 150. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 151. Id. at 21–22. 
 152. Id. at 23. 
 153. Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1219. 
 156. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998). 
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The academic setting also presents unique issues due to the variety of 
employment relationships relative to the institution.  Tenured faculty members 
serve in a “for cause” employment relationship, while non-tenure track faculty 
and staff generally serve in an “at will” capacity.  This difference may manifest 
itself in the opportunity for workplace bullying, an institution’s response, and 
the response of the victim.  Policies may not apply uniformly to all groups.  
For instance, at the authors’ university the “Dispute Resolution” policy 
providing for a variety of specified resolution processes is applicable to 
“employees”—defined as “staff, coworkers, and supervisors.”157  
“Supervisors” include “faculty who supervise staff.”158  Faculty are not 
afforded a formal process, although the university has a voluntary faculty 
dispute resolution program which utilizes faculty mediators and is non-
binding.159 
The faculty handbook makes it clear that evaluations are based upon 
teaching, scholarly work, service, and personal characteristics.160  Personal 
characteristics include “emotional stability or maturity” and “demonstrated 
collegiality and interactional skills so that an individual can work 
harmoniously with others.”161  Faculty members also are evaluated based upon 
ethical behavior, which plainly has an effect on the institution;162 just as the 
university subscribes to the principles of academic freedom, so too to the 
ethical proscription against harassment of students and colleagues as well as 
discrimination.163  The faculty handbook also provides for a Faculty Ethics and 
Advisory Committee, which advises and consults the President of the 
University and others regarding action to be taken where a faculty member is 
accused of ethical violations.164  It contains some very general areas of 
unacceptable interaction; however, it does not detail specific remedies.165  This 
disparity may reflect a self-policing aspect of faculty membership. 
 
 157. University Business Policies and Procedures Manual: 3220 Dispute Resolution Policy, 
UNIV. OF N.M., http://www.unm.edu/~ubppm/ubppmanual/3220.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See UNIV. OF N.M., OMBUDS/DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES FOR FACULTY, available 
at http://ombudsfac.unm.edu/ODR_Brochure_final_080210.pdf. 
 160. UNIV. OF N.M., FACULTY HANDBOOK § B1.2(a), available at http://www.unm.edu/ 
~handbook/Faculty%20Handbook.pdf. 
 161. Id. § B1.2.4. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. § B1.1(a)-(b); id. app. V, § II (“[Professors] avoid any exploitation, harassment, or 
discriminatory treatment of students.”); id. app. V, § III (“Professors do not discriminate against 
or harass colleagues.”). 
 164. Id. § A61.8. 
 165. See UNIV. OF N.M., supra note 160, § C05 (describing acts of misconduct and sanctions 
for committing such acts).  Under consideration at the authors’ university is a faculty disciplinary 
policy which would provide a mechanism to discipline faculty for violations of university policy. 
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Given the documented personnel and organizational costs of workplace 
harassment,166 a strong argument can be made that a university ought to adopt 
an anti-harassment policy before it is necessitated by law.167  Moreover, a 
university can craft a policy that places a high value on free expression.  
Probably the most difficult task is defining harassment; such a definition 
should be specific so as to limit the discretion of those applying it.  Any policy 
must address whether an additional right is being created (unlikely) and 
whether it is intended to limit any other administrative remedies concerning 
bullying (also unlikely).  It should contain both a subjective and objective test 
for harassment.  It should differentiate between professional academic freedom 
and prohibited harassment and make clear that it is to be interpreted consistent 
with First Amendment values.168  It should include an anti-retaliation provision 
protecting those who report or assist in the detection and prevention of 
bullying.  In addition to legislative proposals discussed above, there are 
examples of such policies adopted in the educational context.169  Such a policy 
probably can be added to existing anti-discrimination policies and utilize 
similar procedures, including prompt investigations and attempted 
conciliation.170  Faculty can be made aware of such a policy through training 
and as a component of performance evaluations.171 
Not losing sight of the First Amendment is especially important in an 
academic environment.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit considered a claim that a 
community college was responsible for a hostile work environment by failing 
to enforce its anti-harassment policy against a math professor who aired some 
of his views on race via e-mail and a website maintained by the college.172  
The court had no trouble concluding that the Equal Protection Clause contains 
a right to be free of harassment based upon protected status and that a public 
 
 166. The costs of retaining a bully may include employee turnover and absenteeism, lost 
productivity, higher health care costs, and increased workers’ compensation and discrimination 
claims.  To the extent that these matters take time and personnel (lawyers) to resolve, or result in 
damage awards (albeit under a different theory than workplace bullying), the organization is 
employing resources on a non-productive endeavor.  See Michael Sheehan, Workplace Bullying: 
Responding with Some Emotional Intelligence, 20 INT’L J. OF MANPOWER 57, 59–62 (1999). 
 167. Carol Rick Gibbons et al., Don’t Get Pushed Around: What Employers Should Do to 
Address Bullying Behavior in the Workplace, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2010, at 84, 90. 
 168. For an example of such direction in the context of a school anti-bullying law, see N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.18(a) (2009), which provides that it “shall not be construed to permit 
school officials to punish student expression or speech based on an undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance or out of a desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” 
 169. See SIOUX CITY CMTY. SCH. BD., CODE NO. 403.5, WORKPLACE BULLYING (2009), 
available at http://www.siouxcityschools.org/pages/uploaded_files/403%205.pdf. 
 170. See Gibbons, supra note 167, at 90. 
 171. Id. at 90–91. 
 172. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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employer is required to take prompt action to stop the harassment (although 
discipline of the harasser is not required).173  But the court concluded that the 
professor’s speech was not unlawful harassment; rather, it was protected 
speech on an issue of public concern.174  Content regulation (suppression based 
solely on an unpopular viewpoint) is generally prohibited by the First 
Amendment, and the court deferred, upon academic freedom grounds, on the 
speech and the college’s decision not to take any action against the 
professor.175  The court’s decision was heavily influenced by First Amendment 
values, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, as to 
protected speech and academic freedom.176 
Harassment law generally involves regulating conduct, but when it 
regulates speech the First Amendment is implicated and some line-drawing is 
inevitable.  It is clear that anti-harassment policies are subject to the First 
Amendment.177  Given the interest in equal opportunity, one such formulation 
is to allow the regulation when the harassing speech is directed only at the 
plaintiff, not the public at large.178  Another approach is that such regulation is 
permissible in the employment context because harassment is simply beyond 
First Amendment protection.179  In any event, any workplace harassment 
 
 173. Id. at 707. 
 174. Id. at 708.  A somewhat similar case, though not concerning academic freedom in the 
workplace, concerns a high school student’s right to wear a T-shirt with the message “Be Happy, 
Not Gay.”  Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011).  A 
school official banned display of the slogan as contrary to a school rule prohibiting spoken or 
written derogatory comments based upon sexual orientation.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit held that 
such a ban violated two students’ First Amendment rights given the lack of evidence of 
substantial disruption caused by the message and affirmed nominal damage awards in favor of the 
students.  Id. at 880–82.  Of course, an academic employer has substantial leeway in regulating 
the off-topic speech of faculty directed at students, see Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 
667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006), but the words of the panel resonate: “[P]eople in our society do not have 
a legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or even their way of life.”  Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 
876–77 (rejecting a “hurt feelings” defense to the violation of constitutional rights). 
 175. Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 709; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) 
(establishing that the government may not prohibit speech merely because society disagrees or is 
offended). 
 176. Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 709. 
 177. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 178. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1791, 1845–46 (1992) (proposing that an interest in assuring equality in the workplace 
justifies restricting speech directed at a particular employee). 
 179. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the Free-
Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391, 
397–98 (2002) (arguing that harassment law is designed to prevent economic disruption and that 
the harassing expression does not implicate First Amendment protection). 
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policy in the university setting ought to have a sense of place—recognizing 
that a university traditionally has been open to new ideas.180 
Assuming that a university adopted an anti-harassment policy, how might 
it be challenged on First Amendment grounds?  If it was a faculty member 
(suppose the faculty member received a reprimand for allegedly harassing a 
colleague about a grant), the faculty member might grieve it in accordance 
with university policies pertaining to academic freedom and free expression.  
To the extent that the faculty member contested it on First Amendment 
grounds, one roadblock would be that only employee speech on a matter of 
public concern is protected; workplace speech pertaining to private matters 
generally is not.181  Another roadblock is Garcetti v. Ceballos, which held that 
public employee speech that is pursuant to job responsibilities simply is not 
protected by the First Amendment.182  Garcetti left open whether speech 
related to teaching and research might be protected under an academic freedom 
rationale, but the contours of any such exception are not clear.183  Garcetti 
continues a trend recognizing managerial prerogative and that when the 
government regulates as an employer it has far greater latitude.  It represents a 
formidable barrier (along with the doctrine of qualified immunity)184 to 
challenging managerial action based upon denial of free speech. 
 
 180. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 231–32 (Cal. 2006) (Chin, J., 
concurring) (noting that the First Amendment may protect speech central to creative process 
where workplace product is itself expression). 
 181. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).  The Supreme Court has extended the 
public concern requirement to the right to petition, which includes the filing of grievances.  
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011). 
 182. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–
74 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 183. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.  The Ninth Circuit recently granted qualified immunity to 
various university faculty members based on a former professor’s claims that he was denied a 
merit salary increase in retaliation for his criticism of the hiring and promotion of other 
professors, as well as the hiring of lecturers.  Hong v. Grant, 403 F. App’x 236, 237–38 (9th Cir. 
2010).  The district court held that the professor’s statements were pursuant to his official duties 
as a faculty member and therefore not protected.  Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168 
(C.D. Cal. 2007).  In the alternative, the district court determined that the speech was not on a 
matter of public concern and likewise unprotected.  Id. at 1169–70.  The Ninth Circuit did not 
decide whether the speech was protected and instead granted qualified immunity on the basis that 
the law was not clearly established in 2004, let alone today, that faculty members had a right to 
comment on discretionary administrative matters free from retaliation.  Hong, 403 F. App’x at 
237–38 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (declining to decide whether there is an “academic 
exception” for speech related to teaching or research)). 
 184. An individual defendant may raise a qualified immunity defense so as to defeat civil 
liability for damages.  Once raised, a plaintiff must establish that the facts as alleged establish a 
constitutional violation and that the constitutional right in question was clearly established, viz., 
that a reasonably-informed public official would have been aware that his or her specific conduct 
violated that right.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009).  Qualified immunity 
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CONCLUSION 
Current statutory and common law tort actions provide certain restricted 
avenues of legal redress for those who have been subjected to harassment by 
their coworkers and/or employers.  It seems clear that federal discrimination 
statutes are inadequate to perform that task because of their requirement that 
the harassment be a product of class-based discriminatory animus.  Some form 
of administrative mechanism for developing interpretive guidance and 
attempted administrative resolution of workplace harassment complaints ought 
to precede court involvement; currently, that function is performed by the 
EEOC for many discrimination complaints.185  A federal response has the 
advantage of uniformity, particularly for employers, although the costs of 
implementing such a system are not insubstantial.  At the same time, the 
United States embraces an at-will employment model and places a high value 
on freedom of expression; there may be merit to the idea that workplace 
harassment—barring the presence of a discriminatory or tortious act—should 
be addressed at the institutional level (via prevention) or through alternative 
dispute resolution, which could be incorporated into a general employment 
policy.186  After all, universities as large employers always have the potential 
to become defendants in employment-related lawsuits—a preventive law 
orientation would consider the legal exposure and address it through adoption 
of an anti-harassment policy, a procedural mechanism to enforce it, and 
education and training of the workforce, much as has been done for protected-
status discrimination and harassment.187  Even if institutional exposure is low 
because of the lack of federal and state law providing a cause of action, a 
university might still want to consider such a policy as an option to promote 
dignity and respect in the workplace, and perhaps avoid regulation in the 
future.188  The progress made in eliminating discrimination based upon 
protected class status should not foreclose other efforts to improve the 
 
does not apply to institutional defendants.  Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 
638, 657 (1980). 
 185. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 237.  The number of charges handled by the EEOC for 
FY 2010 was 99,922.  Charge Statistics, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforce 
ment/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  Those dissatisfied with the EEOC’s resolution may 
file a complaint in federal court, however, employment discrimination cases have declined as a 
percentage of the federal docket (from ten to six percent) and some view the federal courts as 
inhospitable to such claims.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 
103–04 (2009). 
 186. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 239–41; Lippel, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that legislative 
enactments are the product of political compromise and should not serve as guides for prevention 
efforts). 
 187. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 275–76. 
 188. See Yamada, supra note 1, at 277. 
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workplace and eliminate destructive and harmful behavior.189  The effect of 
such a proposal on academic freedom is certainly worth considering before 
enactment, but carefully drawn procedures to address workplace harassment in 




 189. See Yamada, supra note 73, at 563–65.  But see Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? 
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1252–66 (2011) 
(suggesting, inter alia, that anti-bullying laws might dilute current gender protection law and 
enforce gender stereotypes). 
